The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War Series Occasional Paper 26, We Were Caught Unprepared: the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War by Matt M. Matthews. The outcome of the war that was, at best a stalemate that for Israel has confounded military analysts throughout the world. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige severely tarnished. Matthews's historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah's doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. His research convincingly argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design(SOD) war fighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were not causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what war, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense. In researching his study, Mr. Matthews interviewed several prominent IDF officers and other experts in the field, many of whom had not previously been interviewed. The result is an insightful, comprehensive examination of the war.

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